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It has been shown that the social security system and other sorts of government transfers have 
helped poor elderly people, such as widows, to live alone in the U.S. This paper investigates 
whether government financial support contributed to the increase in the probability of the 
vulnerable elderly living alone in Latin American countries as well. Specifically, the countries 
that in the 1980s experienced government reforms favorable to the vulnerable elderly, Mexico 
and Uruguay, are examined. It is concluded that the improvement of educational attainment was 
mainly responsible for helping the elderly poor to live alone in rural areas in Mexico, and not the 
government system. On the other hand, in Uruguay, for unmarried elderly females, the increase 
in social security income explains most of the increase in the probability of living alone. 
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  3  41. Introduction 
 
In the late twentieth century, there has been an increase in the number of the elderly who choose 
to live alone  in the United States. According to previous studies, the change in the living 
arrangements of elderly people is enormous. For elderly widows who are considered poor, the 
percentage living alone increased from 18 percent in 1940 to 62 percent in 1990 
(Kramarow,1995 and McGarry and Schoeni,1998). Various studies have searched for the cause 
of this enormous change in the family structure of the elderly, and most have concluded that 
having sufficient individual income is the key to explaining the increase in the percentage of the 
poor elderly living alone. 
After Social Security was enacted in 1935 in the U.S., for instance, the program became 
the main source of income for elderly widows. About two-thirds of the increase in elderly 
widows and more than half of the increase in elderly nonmarried females living alone was 
caused by the increase in Social Security income after 1940 (McGarry and Schoeni, 1998 and 
Costa, 1999). This positive relation between these governmental supports, such as the Social 
Security system and other sorts of public transfers, and the percentage of widows living alone is 
the so-called “crowding-out” effect: as governmental financial supports increase, the percentage 
of the elderly living alone increases. If this effect obtains, governmental financial supports help 
the elderly poor to have more choices available for living arrangements and improve their quality 
of life. 
This crowding-out effect, however, did not necessarily happen in the Latin American 
countries considered here. Although there were government reforms in certain countries in Latin 
America to help the elderly poor, and the same upward trend in the elderly living alone is 
observed in these countries, government supports were not necessarily responsible for producing 
this increase. 
The countries examined in this paper, Mexico and Uruguay, undertook in the last two 
decades social security reforms designed to protect a certain category of the elderly. At the same 
time, the upward trend in the percentage of people living alone is observed for these countries.  
In Mexico, about 20% of rural elderly people who are above 65 chose to live alone in 
1984, whereas 24.6% chose to live alone in 1989 (Tables 1 and 2), an increase of almost 5% over 
a five-year period.  
  5In Uruguay, only 25.7% of widows, 26.5% of single females, and 35.1% of divorced 
females who are over 65 chose to live alone in 1981. In 1995, 34.2% of widows, 30% of single 
females, and 40% of divorced females in the same age range chose to live alone (Tables 3 and 4). 
The fraction of widows who chose to live alone increased by almost 10 percentage points over 
these 15 years; this percentage increase is almost two times larger than what has been seen for 
elderly widows in the United States in the 1990s.  
In Mexico, the social security reform by the Rural Solidarity Program, which started in 
1973 and expanded in the late 1980s, targeted an expansion of the coverage of social security 
and of health care in rural areas (Mesa-Lago,1994). Health care was provided in exchange for 
community service of 10 days. Social security coverage clearly increased in rural areas, as shown 
in Tables 5 and 6. For rural males, coverage increased from 12.6% to 19.7%. For rural females, 
coverage jumped from 8.6% to 21.3%. The latter year’s coverage is almost 2.5 times larger than 
the initial period’s coverage. 
In Uruguay, social security reform enacted in 1987 set a minimum pension (Mesa-
Lago,1994). Those helped by this reform were poor elderly, such as unmarried elderly females, 
who earn below the average income.The average income for these groups jumped about 30%. 
The improvement in social security benefits is clarified by observing the average income 
provided by the social security system. The average total individual income was $1,493.91, 
$1276.38, and $1647.49 in 1981 (in 1990 US dollars) for single females, divorced females, and 
widows, respectively. The averages rose to $1,926.37, $1,670.25, and $2,135.78 in 1995. In the 
same period average social security income rose from $1,275.76, $1,089.99, and $1,406.91 to 
$1,645.76, $1,426.35, and $1,823.90 for single females, divorced females, and widows (Tables 9 
and 10). Both the average total individual income and the average social security income for 
these elderly females increased by 29%, 31%, and 30%, respectively. These increases are much 
more than the average income growth for the general population between 15 and 65 years old, 
which is 12%. Social security coverage in Uruguay did not change much over time for any 
subcategory of the elderly, but it has shown a slight increase. The social security system in 
Uruguay is one of the oldest in the Western Hemisphere and its coverage is among the highest in 
Latin America. The coverage for single females and widows increased from 0.907 to 0.924, by 
1.9 percent, and from 0.953 to 0.974, by 2.2 percent.  
  6What, then, has brought about this remarkable increase in the elderly living alone in rural 
areas of Mexico? And why has the number of elderly livings living alone increased in Uruguay? 
Is there any positive link between increased governmental support brought by the social security 
reform and the increase in the percentage of the elderly living alone, as seen in the U.S.? 
The results obtained in this paper show that in Mexico, governmental financial support 
actually has the opposite effect on the elderly people in rural areas, even when other socio-
economic variables are taken into account. When they have social security, the elderly are 
inclined to live with others. In Mexico, it seems that when the elderly have more total individual 
income, they tend not to live alone.
1 In Uruguay, on the other hand, when people have more 
individual income, they tend to live alone.
2 In 1995, this trend is clearer than in 1981.  
This paper investigates whether, in these Latin American countries, government financial 
support helped the vulnerable elderly to have better living conditions. I observe growth in social 
security income or total individual income, or coverage expansion of social security, in addition 
to improvement in educational attainment, as a proxy for lifetime earnings, and other 
demographic changes.
3  The explanatory power of these variables for the increase in the 
percentage living alone is examined over time, using household surveys at different periods of 
time. 
The next section summarizes the previous work on this issue, and the third section 
presents the model and estimation method. The fourth section briefly explains the data, and the 
                                                 
1 In the Mexican data sets, reported individual income is not complete and almost half of the elderly population did 
not report their individual income. 
2 In order to see if there is any positive relation between individual income and living arrangements as observed in 
the U.S., individual income described by income decile is plotted with the percentage living alone for the elderly 
who reported their income for both countries (Graphs 1, 2, 5, and 6). 
3 For the purpose of observing the effect of the demographic variables that could be related to the percentage living 
alone, age is graphed together with the percentage living alone (Graphs 3, 4, 7, and 8). In both countries, the 
percentage decreases as age increases. This is plausible because the health condition of the elderly becomes worse as 
they age. The relationships between living arrangements and age do not change when the patterns in the percentage 
of people living alone are examined by marital status  (Graphs 9 and 10). 
 
  7fifth section presents results and projections. The conclusion reviews the findings and and 
discusses their some policy implications. 
 
2. Previous Studies 
 
There is an extensive literature investigating the living arrangements of elderly people. In this 
section, the methods that have been used and the results that have been obtained are reviewed for 
studies that examine the determinants of living arrangements (specifically living alone vs. living 
with others) with a focus on income effects. There are several income effects on living 
arrangements of the elderly that have been considered in the past, and these effects can be 
categorized according to source of income: the effect through household total income, through 
the individual income of elderly people, through individual income of children, through private 
transfers, and through public transfers to elderly people.  
Kotlikoff and Morris (1988) estimated the joint living choice of the elderly and their 
children, using as their sample the 1986 HRCA (the Hebrew Rehabilitation Center for the Aged), 
which covers the state of Massachusetts. They applied probit and logit models and found that 
both individual income of the elderly and children’s income have negative effects on the 
probability of living with children. Other variables that show negative effects are health status, a 
dummy for males, a dummy for male children, and a dummy for married children. The authors 
conclude that the elderly tend to live alone when their own income is higher and also when their 
children’s income is higher. 
Böersch-Supan, Hajuvassiliou, Kotlikoff, and Morris (1992) used five surveys of HRCA 
during the period of 1982 and 1987 to see the effect of individual income of elderly people on 
three different choices of living arrangements: living independently (individually or with 
spouse), living with others, and living in an institution. They explored two of the three choices at 
a time using age, a dummy variable for gender, the number of children, marital status of the 
elderly, and various health indicators as explanatory variables. For females, they found that own 
income has a negative effect on living in an institution, applying a multinominal probit model.  
Other researchers have investigated the effect of public transfers on living arrangements 
of the elderly, focusing on subcategories of the elderly. 
Hoerger, Picone, and Sloan (1996) examined the effect of public subsidies on the choice 
of the disabled elderly for their living arrangements. They used two waves of the National Long-
  8Term Care Survey (NLTCS), 1984 and 1989. The multinominal probit model was applied in 
order to observe the effect of public subsidies on three different choices of the disabled elderly: 
living independently, living intergenerationally, and living in an institution. Their specification 
for estimation involves four different types of explanatory variables: family financial resources, 
such as housing wealth; factors affecting formal and informal care prices, such as price of formal 
care and the number of children; government subsidies and policies, such as expected health 
subsidy; and health and demographic variables, such as marital status and health status. They 
discovered a significant negative effect of expected Medicaid home health subsidies (described 
in dollars per week) on living with children when independent living and intergenerational living 
were compared. Other variables that have significant negative effects on the probability of living 
in extended families were nonhousing wealth and a dummy variable for being married. 
The income effect on living arrangements of the elderly prior to 1940 is studied by Costa 
(1997). The Union Army pension program was the first major pension program in the U.S. It 
became universal for disabled veterans by 1910. The percentage of veterans living alone also 
increased during the period of between 1900 and 1910. The study linked the pension records 
from the 1900 and 1910 censuses to the other characteristics of men in 45 Ohio companies; this 
sample resembles a national sample of Union Army veterans in terms of retirement status, wealth 
and status as head of household.  The individuals studied were veterans who were not 
institutionalized and had retired by 1910.  Costa found that Union Army veterans tended to live 
alone when monthly pension income increased. Monthly pension is the only variable that shows 
a significant negative effect on the probability of living in extended families: among all the 
independent variables considered, which included age, number of children, number of children 
squared, poor health, former occupation, illiteracy, immigrant status, and living in the Midwest.  
McGarry and Schoeni (1998) analyze the effect of Social Security and governmental 
income aid to elderly widows in the long run, using data compiled from the 1940, 1950, 1960, 
1970, 1980, and 1990 Censuses. A multinominal logit model is applied to investigate the effect 
of public transfers on four different types of living arrangements: living alone, living with at least 
one adult child, living in an institution, and other arrangements. Social security benefits, year 
dummies, and dummy variables for education, such as years of schooling between 9 and 11, and 
years of schooling 13 or more, show significant negative effects on the probability of living with 
children after controlling for other explanatory variables, such as 5-year age groups, immigrant 
  9status, life expectancy as an indicator for health status, number of children, ethnic background, 
and lien law. Lien laws possibly have a positive effect on the probability of living with others 
since children may live with their elderly parents if their inheritance is reduced by the amount of 
governmental support paid to their parents. McGarry and Schoeni also separately studied the 
effects of public transfer on two choices: living alone and living with adult children. They 
reached the conclusion that Social Security has a negative effect on living with others for 
widows in the United States. 
A recent study by Costa (1999) considered living arrangements of elderly widows 
between 1950 and 1990 and examined the effect of Social Security benefits primarily provided 
by Social Security Old Age Assistance (OAA) between 1940 and 1950 on the living 
arrangements of elderly nonmarried females. She used as independent variables the logarithm of 
average yearly payment from OAA in 1940 US dollars, ethnic background, a dummy variable for 
low education, a year dummy, the logarithm of labor income of heads between the ages of 25 
and 44, fraction of labor force that is agricultural, and immigrant status. Among all these 
variables, the largest significant effect on the probability of living with others, which is 
represented by the fraction of nonmarried elderly females living with others, was found to be the 
negative effect of the logarithm of the average OAA payment. Costa inferred that 40% of the 
actual decrease in the fraction of nonmarried elderly females living with others was caused by 
the increase in Social Security benefits. 
Following this work, a model based on people’s utility from different living arrangements 
is utilized in order to study the effect of social security systems in Latin American countries.  
 
3. Model and Empirical Method 
 
This section presents the model. Hypotheses that are considered in this paper are:  
 
1.  The expansion of social security explains the increase in the elderly living alone. 
2.  Changes in demographic characteristics account for increases in the elderly living 
alone. 
 
These hypotheses are examined for each subcategory of the elderly because the trend of 
living arrangements is different for different groups. Some subgroups have shown an enormous 
  10increase in the percentage of the elderly living alone over time. For Mexico, rural males and rural 
females—the groups that show the most remarkable increase in the percentage of the elderly 
living alone—as well as urban males and urban females are analyzed. For Uruguay, where only 
an urban sample is available, single females, divorced females, and widows are compared.  
In order to analyze the above relationship, first, a utility function is specified in the 
following way: 
 
) 0 , , ( 0 ε p X U U = ,       (1) 
 
   ) 1 , , ( 1 ε p X U = U ,         (2) 
 
where 1 represents living with someone, and 0 represents living alone. U is the utility function 
under each situation. Xp is the set of measurable personal characteristics, and ε stands for 
unmeasured elements of utility in each living arrangement. 
People will choose to live with someone when: 
) 0 , , ( ) 1 , , ( 0 1 ε ε p p X U U X U U = > =     (3) 
The characteristics in Xp  include both economic and demographic factors: individual 
total income, dummy variables for age (the ages between 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and over 80), 
gender, marital status, region (urban or rural), years of schooling (no school or some primary, 
primary completed, some secondary, secondary completed, some higher education), individual 
total income, and social security indicators (covered by social security or not, income from social 
security). In the estimations described below, the excluded category for age is 65-69, and for 
education it is “no school or some primary education.”  All income variables are logarithms in 
1990 US dollars. 
There are other variables that can affect the living arrangements of the elderly. Life 
expectancy has lengthened in both countries. In terms of fertility, the number of children per 
woman has decreased. These factors could lead to an increase in the elderly living alone. 
Changes in these factors, however, are too small to explain the remarkable increase in the 
percentage of elderly people living independently in the medium run that is analyzed here (a 
period of 5 to 15 years) because these variables change very slowly. Also, female labor 
participation has increased over time. As stated in the previous studies, daughters are more likely 
  11than sons to live with their parents. Some studies find the daughter’s labor market participation 
causes a decrease in the elderly living alone. However, the causal link is ambiguous. One can 
equally argue that because more elderly become able to live alone and value privacy, their 
daughters begin to work outside. Other factors, such as life expectancy and social security 
income, do not present the same problems for establishing causality. For example, it is hard to 
make an argument that the elderly became healthier or richer through social security system, 
because they chose to live alone. Therefore, there is no opposite causal relationship between 
these factors and the increase in the elderly living alone.  
In addition to this view, there is another way to look at this problem. One can think that 
the characteristics of people living together may affect elderly people’s living arrangements. 
Since the data set limits us to using only the variables for the elderly, the characteristics of 
people living with the elderly will not be considered. (Furthermore, the endogeneity of the 
characteristics of people living together would be another problem, if one were to include those 
characteristics of others as independent variables in the estimation equation.)  
I use a linear model 
 
i pi i i X U U µ β + = − ' 0 1 ,         (4) 
 
where µ is unmeasurable determinant of the utility difference between the two conditions. 
The probability of living with someone becomes: 
 
    ) 0 ( Prob ) ( Prob 0 1 0 1 > − = > U U U U
   ) 0 ( Prob > + = µ β p X  
   ) ( Prob p X β µ − > =         (5) 
When µ is normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance, the probability of living with 
someone is: 
 
) ( Prob p X β µ< =F( ) p X β         (6) 
with F is the cumulative normal distribution function. 
This is estimated by a probit model with 1 meaning “living with someone” and 0 
meaning “living alone”. 
  12I can examine the behavior of the elderly for each year. I can also use the data sets from 
different years together. The regression equation then is: 
 
it pi i i D X U U µ γ β + + = − ' 0 1  ,     (7) 
where t is the time, and D is a dummy variable for year, hereafter referred to as the “year 
dummy”. γ is expected to be negative when a dummy variable for year indicates 1 for the later 
year and when more elderly people have chosen to live alone recently.
4  This year dummy 
captures the change in the probability of living with others if such a change occurs. 
The two hypotheses are investigated using the probit model based on equation (7) with 
pooled data. For the first hypothesis, the probability in the initial year is calculated by setting all 
variables at the mean level in the initial year. Then, only the social security variable is changed 
to the mean value in the later year. These two estimated probabilities are compared, and the size 
of the change that is caused by the increase in the coverage of social security is explored. The 
first and second hypotheses use this method for social security income (or the social security 
indicator) and demographic variables, respectively. These hypotheses clarify which of the above 




The quality of the Mexican income variable is poor for the elderly.  If the estimation is 
conducted with an individual income variable, almost half (45% in 1984, and 46% in 1989)
5 of 
the sample must be dropped. There are two ways to tackle this problem. One way is to use an 
income variable available outside of the sample. For example, the average income by state, 
                                                 
4 There is another way to capture the difference across years. The variation in the behavior of each age cohort over 
time can be picked up from a dummy variable for each age cohort: 
 
it pt i i D D D D X U U µ γ γ γ γ β + + + + + = − 4 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 0 1 ' 
 
where   are cohort-specific dummies: aged 66-70, aged 71-75, aged 76-80, and aged 81+ in the initial year 
(Deaton, 1985) and Jappelli and Pagano (1994). In this paper, year dummies are examined.  
4 1,...D D
5 For Uruguay, the percentage of elderly people with missing income is 8% in 1981 and 6% in 1995. 
  13gender, and age. Another way is to use an econometric method to correct for a possible selection 
problem existing in the data set. In this paper, the second method is applied.  
The econometric model is: 
 
i si i X I λ α + =
*                (8) 
         0 1
* > = i I if I
         0 0
* ≤ = i I if I
i pi i i X U U µ β + = − 0 1       (9) 
 
) 0 0 ( Pr ) 0 ( Pr 0 1 > + > + = > > λ α µ β s p i X and X ob I and U U ob  
) , , ( 2 ρ β α p s X X Φ =        (10) 
where Φ  is the bivariate cumulative distribution function and ρ is the covariance between µ 
and λ. I is an implicit function for income, and if it is greater than zero, individual income is 
observed. This bivariate model was presented by Poirier (1980) as an extension of the Heckman 
selection model (Heckman, 1979) and has been used in various settings (for example, in the 
investigation of the determination of union status by Abowd and Farber, 1982).  
2
In equation (8), I=1 means the elderly person reported his/her individual income, and 0 
means that individual income is missing. In equation (9), the dependent variable is the 
probability of living with others: 1 applies to elderly people living with others, and 0 is living 
alone. Only if the elderly have 1 in the first equation (8) are they included in the second equation 
(9). Therefore, this is a nested bivariate probit model. In order to observe the effect, at least one 
independent variable that explains the missing income, but is not correlated directly with living 
arrangements, should be included in the first equation. There are several variables that can be 
considered. Labor market status, such as the unemployment rate of average young people living 
in the same type of household or in the same region, is a possible candidate. In this paper, as 
explanatory variables in the first probit model, I use the average age of the members of the 
household, the average labor market status of the members of the household, and years of 
schooling of each person. 
In addition, the relation between these two decisions (whether to report income and 
whether to live with others) is represented by the correlation between the error term in the first 
  14equation (8) and the error term in the second equation (9). For example, if elderly people tend to 
live with others when they report income,  i λ  and  i µ  will have the same sign and the correlation 
between these variables should be close to one. On the other hand, if elderly people tend to live 
alone when they report income,  i λ  and  i µ   will have the opposite sign and the correlation 
between these variables should be close to minus one. If there is no relation between these two 
decisions, the correlation between these error terms should be close to zero. In fact, in the 
analyses of this paper, the correlation between  i λ  and  i µ   was very close to one for all 
subcategories as I will review in the next section. Therefore, elderly people in Mexico tend to 
live with others when they report their income. As a result, in bivariate models the coefficients of 
income are expected to be smaller than those in probit models without any correction for a 
possible selection problem. 
The more details from results using a bivariate probit model and using a probit model 




The data used here are household surveys collected by the Inter-American Development Bank 
for a larger project with which the author has been involved. For Mexico, national surveys from 
1984 and 1989 are used. The individuals are persons over 65 who reported basic demographic 
variables. Marital status variables and social security income are not available for Mexico, but 
the variable which indicates the coverage of social security is available at the individual level. 
The household survey in 1989 contains more observations. The number of people above 65 
increased from 997 in 1984 to 2,697 in 1989. In both years, about 41% of the elderly are in rural 
areas, the number of observations being 404 in 1984 and 1096 in 1989. Females constitute 54% 
of total elderly people in both years. 533 observations in 1984 and 1440 observations in 1989 are 
elderly females. The elderly reported most demographic and economic variables, with the 
exception of total individual income. In the Mexican surveys, people report their individual 
income by themselves, one column for each. In the regression with total individual income as 
one of the independent variables, less than half of the elderly females are included because only 
about 29% (in 1989) to 39% (in 1984) of rural females and about 35% (in 1984) to 37% (in 
1989) of urban females reported positive income. 226 observations (73 in 1984 and 153 in 1989) 
of rural females, 590 observations (156 in 1984 and 434 in 1989) of rural males, 450 
  15observations (116 in 1984 and 334 in 1989) of urban females, and 744 observations (207 in 1984 
and 537 in 1989) of urban males are used in the regression examining the effect of total 
individual income on the probability of living alone. 
For Uruguay, surveys from 1981 and 1995 are used; these surveys, however, cover only 
urban areas. For Uruguay, both marital status and income through the social security system are 
available.
6  The latter year’s survey contains more observations and the number of elderly 
increased from 3,826 to 9,806. More than half of the elderly population is female (59% in 1981 
and 61% in 1995). The distribution of each marital status group of elderly females stays the 
same. Specifically, widows are dominant and 53% in 1981 (1,190 observations) and 52% in 
1995 (3,070 observations) of elderly females are widows. In Uruguayan surveys, the majority of 
elderly people reported total individual income and social security income. About 92% of single 
females, about 85% of divorced females, and about 96% of widows reported their social security 
income. However, only 62% of married females in 1981, and 73% in 1995, reported individual 
social security income. 736 observations of single females (223 in 1981 and 513 in 1995), 376 
observations of divorced females (80 in 1981 and 296 in 1995), and 4,124 observations (1,134 in 
1981 and 2,990 in 1995) of widows are used in the following regression analyses. 





This section explores the relation between individual incomes that are increased by governmental 
reform in the social security system and the percentage of the elderly living alone. Privacy is a 
normal good. Because of the budget constraints of elderly people, they previously could not 
afford to live alone or to purchase privacy. After income is increased, they may become able to 
live alone. If more elderly people can manage to live alone, this fact indicates better living 
conditions for the elderly. Government reforms targeted certain categories: the elderly people in 
                                                 
6 It is ideal to restrict the sample to the elderly who have at least one child if there is a large variation in the number 
of children across elderly people, but the information on the number of children is not available.  
7 For Mexico, household surveys do not include elderly people who are institutionalized. For the Uruguayan 1981 
data, the elderly who live with more than five non-relatives are excluded, according to the definition that is used in 
the previous literature. There are two in 1981 who fall into this category, and here is no one in this category in 1995. 
  16rural areas in Mexico, and elderly females (except those who were married) in Uruguay. 
Therefore, the positive link between increased income and the probability of living alone is 
expected particularly for these categories. 
In Uruguay, there is a significant positive effect of the jump of social security income on 
the probability of unmarried elderly females’ living alone. Of all elderly females, excepting those 
were married, this income effect (a negative effect on the percentage of elderly females living 
with others) is the largest for single females as opposed to divorced or widowed females. This 
positive relation between social security income and the probability of living alone of elderly 
females coincides with the prediction of previous U.S. studies. Apparently, the government 
helped to improve the living conditions of elderly people. 
On the other hand, in Mexico, social security income is not reported as a separate 
variable and individual income (that should contain the information about the increase in 
disposable income through government aid in health care costs) is not reported by half of the 
elderly living in rural areas. Therefore, in order to see the relationship between governmental 
support and the probability of elderly people living alone, the social security indicator reported 
individually (0: not covered by social security, and 1: covered) is examined. Additionally, 
individual income is considered only for those who reported it, and the effects are examined in 
two ways: using only individuals who reported income,  and controlled for the possible selection 
problem with reported income. Neither social security coverage nor individual income has the 
expected sign for the rural population. As described in detail below, the social security status 
indicates both free health care cost and poor health condition. Therefore, I need to interpret this 
negative effect of the social security indicator on the probability of living alone with caution. In 
addition, individual income after controlled for the selection problem with reporting income has 
a very small and insignificant effect on the probability of living alone. It appears that income 
does not matter much for elderly people when they make decisions on living arrangements in 
Mexico.
8 
In this section, the results from estimation are presented in the following order: first, the 
results from regressions using only urban population are presented for both countries and 
                                                 
8 It may be true that there has been some change in the preference of people over time. The data set used here is too 
short to analyze this possibility.  
  17compared. Second, results are investigated for each subcategory (for Mexico, rural females, rural 
males, urban females, and urban males and for Uruguay, single females, divorced females, and 
widows). Finally, some outcomes from projections using the pooled regression with both years 
are considered and the previously stated hypotheses are investigated. All the results are reported 
by country.  
 
Comparison of Regressions for Mexico and Uruguay 
 
Before examining targeted subcategories for each country, the same specification is applied to 
the same subcategory−urban population by each gender−in both countries in order to compare 
the effect of the same explanatory variables on the probability of living with others.  
In the following estimation, dependent variables are an indicator of living arrangements: 
0 means living alone (with or without a spouse), and 1 means living with others. Independent 
variables include years of schooling (no school or some primary, primary completed, some 
secondary, secondary completed, some higher education); a dummy variable for age (ages 
between 65-69, 70-74, 75-79, and over 80); a social security indicator (0 means not covered by 
social security and 1 means covered by social security); a year dummy; and a constant. The 
excluded category for age is the age group between 65-69, and for education it is “no school or 
some primary education.”  
For Uruguay, the social security indicator is constructed in a way that is consistent with 
the Mexican indicator. The social security variable in this regression is a dummy variable for 
reported social security income: 1 means reported positive social security income, and 0 means 
no reported social security income. In Uruguay, about 90% of the elderly population is covered 
by social security (Tables 7 and 8). Therefore, the social security indicator should have about the 
same effect as a constant term, because most people have 1 for the social security indicator. This 
comparison regression includes all the urban population in the data sets. There are 1,239 urban 
females and 955 urban males in Mexico, and 8,204 urban females and 5,428 urban males in 
Uruguay used in the regression.   
Tables 11-14 report the effect of the social security indicator on the probability of living 
with others for the urban population in both countries. The social security indicators have 
positive effects on the probability of living with others, with the exception of urban males in 
Uruguay. The same indicator has a negative but insignificant effect on the probability of living 
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have lower income tend to live with others. Another plausible reason for this negativity is that 
having social security is positively correlated with age and education. In this case, since both age 
and education have negative effects on the probability of living with others, the coefficient of 
social security income can be negative even when its pure effect is positive. For urban females 
and males in Mexico and for urban females in Uruguay, the social security indicator does not 
have a significant effect on the probability of living with others, and its coefficient is positive. 
The year dummy has a negative and significant coefficient in urban areas in Uruguay, but not in 
Mexico. This implies that, as far as urban areas are considered, in Uruguay there is a significant 
decrease in the percentage living alone over time, but not in Mexico. Education, especially some 
secondary education, is an important factor in explaining the increase in the percentage of the 
elderly living alone in urban Mexico for both females and males. It is significant and negative in 
urban Uruguay as well, although the size of the effect is not as large as in urban Mexico.  
Next, the results are examined for each subcategory defined above by country. First, the 




In Mexico, I am able to estimate equation (7) with data on the rural population as well, which is 
the category the government targeted in the reform begun in 1973. I am mainly interested in the 
rural population and the effect of government support on their probability of living alone. In rural 
areas, the people who are covered by social security are free from the health care cost. In urban 
areas, however, social security does not include such aid. Since the effects of the social security 
system on the probability of living alone for both groups, the one targeted by the government and 
the other which is not, are very different, these groups are analyzed separately and compared.   
Overall, the coefficients on the social security indicator did not come out with the 
expected sign for the rural population. They are positive as shown in Tables 15-26. When rural 
females have social security, they tend to live with others. This positive effect is somewhat 
lessened in urban areas. Although the coefficients of social security are negative for both urban 
males and urban females when education variables are omitted from the regression, they are not 
significant. Therefore, there is some positive relation between education, as a proxy for lifetime 
earnings, and being covered by social security in urban areas. 
  19Tables 15-26 report both coefficients and marginal effects for Mexico at the mean value 
of explanatory variables by sub-categorized group, rural females, rural males, urban females, and 
urban males. As explanatory variables, all possible demographic variables that have been used 
previously in the literature and that are likely to be relevant to the change in the percentage of 
those living alone over a five-year period are included in addition to the social security indicator. 
The number of children and life expectancy, which have been used in the previous studies 
analyzing the effect of these variables on the probability of living alone in the long run, are not 
likely to affect the percentage over the short run. As a result, they are not included in the 
regression. The dependent variable is an indicator of living arrangements as before: 0 means 
living alone and 1 means living with others. The explanatory variables are a dummy variable for 
educational attainments: no school or some primary, primary completed, some secondary, 
secondary completed, some higher education; a dummy variable for age: the ages between 65-
69, 70-74, 75-79, and over 80; the social security indicator: 0 means not covered by social 
security and 1 means covered by social security; a year dummy; and a constant term. Excluded 
categories are no school or some primary education and the youngest age group, between 65 and 
69. 
In these pooled regressions, the year dummy that captures the trend in living 
arrangements has different outcomes for each of the subcategories. For rural females, in any 
regression, this year dummy comes out significant with a negative sign. This means that 
independent from the effects caused by other explanatory variables, there is a significant increase 
in the elderly living alone over this 5-year period. This trend is also shown for rural males. For 
females in urban areas, there is an increase in the elderly living alone again, though not for urban 
males. The coefficients of year dummies are smaller in urban areas than in rural areas. It is 
concluded that the significant trend in the fraction of the elderly living alone is found for the 
rural population but not for the urban population. 
Among the effects of regressors on the probability of living with others, I am specifically 
interested in those of social security and of income. Therefore, the effects of these two variables 
are examined first.  
Social security has a positive effect on living with others in rural areas, both for females 
and males, but this effect is not significant for males. This positive effect of social security is 
significant, though, for rural females. The estimation is conducted with and without education 
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regression, and for urban females and males the effects decrease dramatically. Considering the 
fact that education is negatively correlated with the probability of living with others, social 
security and education are considered to be negatively correlated. This seems plausible for rural 
females, since covered people in rural areas tend to be poor. In urban areas, it may be true that 
people do not care about social security benefits when they are more educated and are likely to 
be wealthy. For rural males, the opposite is true and social security is positively correlated with 
education. The correlation between social security and income is interesting to observe and is 
investigated next. 
The effects of social security go up when total individual income is included as a 
regressor for rural females and for the urban population. This indicates that social security is 
positively correlated with income while income is positively related with the probability of living 
with others. This is true for rural females and urban females. For urban males, however, income 
is negatively correlated with the probability of living with others and consequently social 
security is negatively correlated with income. Therefore, wealthy urban males are likely to be 
educated and also not likely to be covered by social security. This seems true when wealthy 
people do not have to depend on social security after retirement. For females, this scenario is not 
applicable, and they tend to depend on social security even when they are wealthy.  
The next important factor for elderly people in deciding their living arrangements would 
be total individual income. Without correction for the possible selection problem with missing 
values of individual income, the reported individual income has a positive but insignificant effect 
in rural areas overall. When rural elderly have more income, they tend to live with others. 
Income variables have a negative effect for urban males, although this effect is not significant. 
This negative sign seems more plausible and consistent with the results that are obtained using 
the U.S. data after 1960. 
For the purpose of observing the income effect more clearly, the regressions with and 
without educational attainment are compared. The effects of total individual income are 
weakened by exclusions of education variables for all subcategories. It is concluded that for rural 
females, rural males, and urban females, income is likely to be negatively correlated with their 
education. When urban males have more education, it is not clear what kind of effect higher 
education has on the probability of living with others. If education makes individuals more likely 
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however, take into account the possible selection problem with reported income that may exist in 
the data set. Therefore, these effects are likely to be biased, and the interpretation of the 
correlation between education and income is only for the selected individuals people if more 
educated people tend to report their income.  
The effects of other independent variables are now reviewed. In rural areas, for males, 
younger age came out significant with a negative sign. This is consistent with the previous 
interpretation of age in the literature as an indicator of health condition. When age increases, 
health status worsens and a spouse tends not to survive. Therefore, it is harder to live alone.  
The effect of the education variable, the primary completed education, has a significant 
negative effect on the probability of living with others for rural females. When elderly people 
complete primary education, the probability of living with others decreases by 13.8 percentage 
points for rural males and by 10.7 percentage points for rural females. 
These results from the pooled regression are now used in order to see which variable 
contributes the most to the increase in the probability of living alone (or the decrease in the 
probability of living with others). All variables are set to the mean values in the initial year, 
1984, and one variable at a time is changed to its mean value in 1989. The results are presented 
in Table 27. For rural females, when social security coverage is changed to the mean value in the 
later year, the probability of living with others goes up by 0.7 percentage points, from the 
estimated probability of 82.7% to 83.4%. When age variables are changed with the mean value 
of the age dummy for the ages between 75 and 79, the probability decreases by 0.1 percentage 
points. For the rural population, the variable that shows the largest contribution is education. 
When the mean value in 1989 is used for the education dummy for primary completed education, 
the probability of living with others drops by 3.4 percentage points from 0.774 to 0.740 for rural 
males. The estimated probability in 1989 for rural males is 0.747. Therefore, the second 
hypothesis is not rejected and the increase in the primary completion rate brings most of the 
increase in the elderly living alone for rural males. However, the first hypothesis is rejected for 
both rural females and rural males.  
In short, in rural areas in Mexico, social security has a positive but not significant effect 
on the probability of living with others. The effect of social security in rural areas, however, 
needs to be interpreted with care. The social solidarity program, which targeted the rural 
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to be unhealthy; this system is similar to Medicare in the U.S.  The areas that this program 
targeted are selected based on 19 indicators of health condition and poverty. As a result, those 
areas had the highest rates of death by contagious and parasitic diseases and did not have water 
and waste disposal systems with certain qualities. Therefore, being covered by social security 
means that a person is likely to be poor and unhealthy. If this dummy indicates mainly poor 
health condition, individuals should have a tendency to live with others when they are covered 
by social security, and the positive effect of social security on the probability of living with 
others is expected. If social security frees  individual income for health care, it should allow 
people to have more choices in living arrangements, including living alone. This predicts a 
negative relation between being covered by social security and living with others. With the data 
sets that are available, there is no way to separate out these two conflicting effects of social 
security on the probability of living with others. Therefore, it is possible that the insignificant 
effect of social security for rural males is caused by these two effects working against each other.  
For rural females, some secondary education has a significant and negative effect, and for 
rural males, completed primary education has a significant and negative effect. Contrary to prior 
perceptions based on the results from the U.S. data sets, it is concluded that social security did 
not crowd out inter-generational living arrangements in rural areas. For urban areas, social 
security has a negative effect in the estimated equation without education. Crowding out may 
have happened in urban areas, but this effect is not significant. The small crowding-out effect is 
based on the fact that the social security coverage went up in urban areas with only a small 
increase in the percentage of elderly people living alone. 
Next, the results from the biprobit model that corrects for the possible selection problem 
with income are considered. The biprobit model has two probit models with two discrete 
dependent variables: reported individual income or not, and living alone or not. The first probit 
model with a variable denoting reported income or not has several independent variables: the 
average age of the members of the household, the average labor market status of the members of 
the household, and individual years of schooling. The average labor market status is not related 
to the choice of living arrangements directly and is related to the labor market status in the region 
where each household resides. In this selection probit model, the dependent variable is an 
indicator for reporting income: 0 means income is not reported and 1 means reported. Except for 
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when people have more education, they tend to report their income and vice versa.  
After the possible selection problem with income is corrected in this way, the coefficients 
of individual income become smaller but still positive and insignificant for rural population and 
urban females. For urban males, the coefficient is negative but again smaller than that before 
correction and not significant. These decreases in the size of coefficients are possibly caused by 
the positive correlation between reported individual income and the probability of living with 
others. The correlation between the error term in the first probit model and the error term in the 
second probit model is very close to one. Therefore, elderly people in Mexico tend to live with 
others when they report income and this tendency contributes to the decrease in the coefficients 
of income. The effect of social security is still positive and insignificant for all subgroups and the 
size of the effects is smaller compared to the regression before correction. This decrease in the 
size is possibly explained by the negative correlation between living with others and having 




For Uruguay, the groups most affected by government reform are single females, divorced 
females, and widows. In Uruguay, information on income purely from the social security system 
is available for each elderly person. Therefore, it is possible to directly measure the effect of the 
increase in social security income caused by the government reform on the probability of the 
poor elderly living alone.  
Both the percentage of individuals living independently and social security income went 
up for the elderly poor; specifically, the increase for widows is dramatic. An increase in social 
security income between two years for males is 9.4%, whereas that for widows is 29.6%. 
Moreover, males have social security income far above the average of all elderly people;. the 
average social security income of males is above the average social security income of the 
elderly by 31.5% in 1981 and 23.3% in 1995. As a consequence, males are not likely to be 
affected by the establishment of the minimum pension in 1987. Similarly, married people are not 
likely to be influenced by the minimum pension, because when they live together with a spouse, 
the pension as a household should not be smaller than the average. Therefore, in the following 
analyses, the poor elderly, specifically, single females, divorced females, and widows, are 
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induced by the settlement of minimum pension and the probability of living with others.  
As before, as explanatory variables in equation (7), all the possible demographic 
variables that are considered to affect the probability of living alone are included, in addition to 
the social security income which is available for each individual in Uruguay. 
The number of children and life expectancy are not likely to affect the probability of 
living alone over the medium run, since these variables changed by only a negligible amount (for 
example, the number of children of the average woman decreased by only 0.01 over a 15-year 
period). The health status variable that is found in the survey has no meaningful implication 
because, with the exception of fewer than 10 people, the rest of the elderly reported having no 
problems with their health.  
Independent variables that are used now with the income from social security are a 
dummy variable for educational attainments, a dummy variable for age, and a year dummy. 
Excluded categories for the dummy variables are, as in the case of Mexico, no school or some 
primary education and the youngest age group with an age between 65 and 69.  
First, the regression is examined for all females including the interacted terms (year 
dummies and marital status, the amount of social security income and marital status) in order to 
clarify if there is a statistically significant difference in the effect of social security income by 
marital status. If the test leads to a conclusion that there is a significant difference in the 
coefficients by marital status, I need to investigate the effect of social security income on the 
probability of living alone for each subgroup.  Then, the estimation equation with the same 
specification is investigated by marital status for elderly females except married ones.  
The effect of social security income on the probability of living with others is negative 
and significant for urban females in Uruguay. The effect of SS (social security) income is on 
average –0.064 (Table 28). Therefore, when SS income rises by $1,000 per year, the probability 
of living alone increases by 4 percentage points. When the regressions with and without 
education variables are compared, the effect of SS income stays the same. This result implies 
that the correlation between education and SS income is very small when all urban females are 
examined.  
However, when a dummy variable for married people is included, the coefficient of SS 
income decreases from –0. 165 to –0.252 (Table 29). Dummy variables for younger age now 
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without a dummy variable for married people. Married people tend to be younger and the year 
dummy is negatively correlated with those persons.  Considering the fact that married people do 
not have high social security income, the decrease in the coefficients of social security income is 
caused by weakened influences from age dummies and the year dummy. This dummy variable 
for married people can be considered as an indicator of having husbands who are alive. It is not 
possible to tell if divorced females have living husbands or not. This, however, is irrelevant for 
the probability of living alone because divorced females will not live with their ex-husbands. If 
husbands are alive, elderly females have a strong tendency to live alone (a category that includes 
living with a spouse). 
When total individual income is included instead of SS income, the coefficient of total 
income comes out to be similar to that of social security income. The coefficients of total income 
are slightly larger than those of SS income. In regressions both with and without education 
variables, total income has an even stronger negative effect on the probability of living with 
others. One thing that is different from the previous result is that education now has a positive 
effect. This is because there is a positive correlation between total individual income and 
education. When total individual income increases by $1,000, the percentage living alone 
increases by 4 percentage points on average for urban females in Uruguay. 
When the effects of both total income and SS income are examined at the same time, the 
coefficients of total income are significantly negative. On the other hand, the coefficients of SS 
income are significantly positive. The absolute size of the coefficient of total income is larger in 
the regression with SS income than in the one without. Taking into account the negative relation 
between SS income and the probability of living with others, this shows that total income is 
positively related with SS income. This is true because for females more than 90% of total 
income is from social security (Tables A.1 and A.2). Total income and SS income are almost 
identical. In the following analyses, these two are examined separately. 
Next, a joint test is conducted in order to observe whether there is a significant difference 
in the effect of SS income or year dummies by marital status. For SS income, these variables are 
interacted with marital status: single, widow, and married. Then, a joint test of the hypothesis of 
having zero coefficients for all the interacted terms is performed. The statistic is distributed as 
chi-squared, and the result rejects the possibility of these coefficients being zero. Similarly, a 
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Therefore, the effects of  these variables are different by marital status and it is better to conduct 
the regression analyses separately for each subgroup with different marital status.  
Now the effect of SS income on the probability of living with others is explored for the 
poor elderly females that are most likely to be influenced by the government reform: single 
females, divorced females, and widows. The results for the effect of SS income are the same 
when urban females are examined by marital status. The results are reported in Tables 31-33. 
The effect of social security is negative and significant for all subcategories of poor elderly 
females. For example, a $1,000 increase in annual SS income yields a 9 percent increase in the 
probability of living alone for single females, an 8 percent increase for divorced females, and a 7 
percent increase for widows. The other variables that contribute to the increase in the percentage 
of living alone are year dummies. The trend in the percentage of elderly females living alone is 
captured by the year dummy. There is a 2 to 7% increase in the elderly living alone over this 15-
year period of analysis that is independent from the effect of other variables. In the regression 
without education categories, the absolute effect of SS income is smaller for single females and 
widows and larger for divorced females. Education is mostly negatively correlated with the 
probability of living with others for single females and divorced females and is positively 
correlated for widows. Thus, SS income is positively related to education for single females and 
is negatively related for divorced females and widows.  
Total income has a similar negative effect on the probability of living with others for all 
elderly females except those who are married. The changes in the coefficients of total income 
with and without education imply a positive relation between income and education for single 
females and a negative relation between income and education for divorced females and widows, 
as in the case of social security income.  
Next, a projection is made using the results from the pooled regression. The estimated 
probabilities of living with others are compared for each subcategory. As shown in Table 34, the 
increase in SS income can explain almost 100% of the increases in the percentage of single 
females, divorced females, and widows. SS income definitely accounts for the largest portion of 
the increase in the percentage of living alone that occurred over this period. Other variables 
explain only less than 1% of the increase in the probability of living alone. The increase in the 
probability of the elderly living alone cannot be explained by any single variable other than SS 
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urban females in Uruguay.  
If in the next 15 years the income from social security is doubled, and the effect of its 
change on the probability of living alone stays the same, 10% more single females, 9% more 
divorced females, and 8% more widows will live alone. Since these females represent 41% of the 
total elderly population, this change will bring about a 4% increase in the total elderly who 
choose to live alone, all other things equal. 
In sum, the crowding-out effect of SS income on living with others is found for all 
subcategories of urban females in Uruguay and this effect is large and significant. This result is 
consistent with the study that examined the effect of OAA (the Old-Age Assistance program) 
and SSI (the Supplemental Security Income program) on the probability of living alone for 
widows in the U.S. in the late twentieth century using IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata 
Series), as observed by McGarry and Schoeni (1998). The size of the crowding-out effect 
produced by the increase in SS income for urban females in Uruguay is similar to its effect for 




This paper has investigated whether the increase in social security benefits has helped protected 
elderly people to live alone: rural females and rural males in Mexico, and single females, 
divorced females, and widows in Uruguay. The results are fairly robust. In rural areas of Mexico, 
social security does not have a negative effect on the probability of living with others. For rural 
males, primary completed education, rather than social security, has a significant and negative 
effect on this probability. On the other hand, in Uruguay, for all subcategories who benefited 
most from the government reform, social security income consistently has a significant and 
negative effect. Therefore, the increase in social security income helps more single females, 
divorced females, and widows to live alone.  
It is preferable for elderly people to have as many available choices of living 
arrangements as possible and to be able to choose to live alone when they wish. Also the fact that 
more poor elderly people became able to live alone indicates the improved quality of life for the 
poor elderly. In Uruguay, government financial support helps the elderly to choose to live alone. 
In Mexico, however, government transfers are not necessarily supporting the choice of living 
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live with others. Only more education seems to change these traditional living arrangements and 
make more elderly choose to live alone in rural Mexico. 
It may be plausible that social security does not have a crowding-out effect on living with 
others when the social security system is not a dependable financial source. The coverage of 
social security was less than 50% in Mexico in the late 1980s. Another reasonable explanation 
would be that privacy is an inferior good until income reaches a certain level. This seems true for 
Mexico. Graphs 1 and 2 suggest a U-curve relationship between income distribution and the 
percentage of people living alone. This implies that when people have more individual income 
they are likely to live with others up to a certain level of income. 
In Mexico, although traditional living arrangements such as living in a large family seem 
preferred, completed primary completed education increases the probability of living alone by 
10% to 13% in rural areas. In Uruguay, on the other hand, the increase in social security income 
by $1,000 per year crowds out elderly people living with others by around 10% for urban 
females. If the policy is formed in order to enable poor elderly people to have more choices of 
living arrangements and to let them choose to live alone when they prefer, in Mexico, education 
is the key in rural areas, rather than social security in this period of analysis, and in Uruguay, the 
continual increase in the social security income is essential for urban females. 
Apart from the influence of social security, there is also a question of the validity of 
measuring living standards by living arrangements in this region. Table A.4 shows the effect of 
individual income (log (total individual income)) on the probability of living with others in 17 
Latin American countries in the late 1990s. In Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the 
increase in income will significantly reduce the probability of living with others. In Colombia 
and Mexico, by contrast, the increase in income will raise the probability of living with others. 
The rest of the countries demonstrate the insignificant effect of income on the probability. 
Although it seems that not all the elderly prefer living alone when they become relatively 
wealthy, there is a tendency towards valuing privacy when it is possible. The question of living 
standard appears to require more investigation at the country level.  
In this paper, the countries with social security reform enacted in the 1980s are examined 
in order to see the relationship between the increase in the governmental support and living 
arrangements in the elderly. It would also be interesting to study several countries with different 
  29histories of their social security systems or with different income levels and observe if the 
preference changes over time or the limitation of income prevents people from choosing to live 
alone without any change in preferences in the long run.  
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  34age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.193 337 65-69 0.166 118 65-69 0.207 219
70-74 0.174 298 70-74 0.216 119 70-74 0.147 179
75-79 0.235 164 75-79 0.290 74 75-79 0.191 90
80- 0.275 198 80- 0.159 93 80- 0.342 105
Total 0.212 997 Total 0.202 404 Total 0.218 593
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.167 175 65-69 0.222 162
70-74 0.167 164 70-74 0.184 134
75-79 0.168 78 75-79 0.312 86
80- 0.250 116 80- 0.311 82
Total 0.187 533 Total 0.243 464
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.124 55 65-69 0.203 63
70-74 0.204 63 70-74 0.231 56
75-79 0.273 31 75-79 0.305 43
80- 0.156 54 80- 0.164 39
Total 0.181 203 Total 0.225 201
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.186 120 65-69 0.233 99
70-74 0.147 101 70-74 0.147 78
75-79 0.106 47 75-79 0.318 43
80- 0.307 62 80- 0.392 43
Total 0.190 330 Total 0.257 263









age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.216 926 65-69 0.249 370 65-69 0.194 556
70-74 0.252 673 70-74 0.279 284 70-74 0.233 389
75-79 0.289 500 75-79 0.291 213 75-79 0.288 287
80- 0.168 598 80- 0.161 229 80- 0.172 369
Total 0.228 2697 Total 0.246 1096 Total 0.215 1601
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.228 480 65-69 0.202 446
70-74 0.223 366 70-74 0.292 307
75-79 0.298 254 75-79 0.278 246
80- 0.099 340 80- 0.264 258
Total 0.208 1440 Total 0.251 1257
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.270 175 65-69 0.228 195
70-74 0.247 148 70-74 0.316 136
75-79 0.284 91 75-79 0.295 122
80- 0.114 117 80- 0.221 112
Total 0.230 531 Total 0.263 565
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.203 305 65-69 0.183 251
70-74 0.208 218 70-74 0.273 171
75-79 0.305 163 75-79 0.260 124
80- 0.091 223 80- 0.290 146
Total 0.196 909 Total 0.242 692










  35age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.451 1341 65-69 0.430 765 65-69 0.478 576
70-74 0.444 1102 70-74 0.398 630 70-74 0.504 472
75-79 0.404 706 75-79 0.353 419 75-79 0.477 287
80- 0.291 677 80- 0.223 440 80- 0.418 237
Total 0.412 3826 Total 0.366 2254 Total 0.477 1572
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.355 82 65-69 0.562 361
70-74 0.241 62 70-74 0.612 214
75-79 0.256 43 75-79 0.634 93
80- 0.169 59 80- 0.527 55
Total 0.264 246 Total 0.584 723
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.362 36 65-69 0.295 285
70-74 0.356 28 70-74 0.291 326
75-79 0.272 22 75-79 0.276 261
80- 0.500 8 80- 0.173 318
Total 0.351 94 Total 0.257 1190
Note: 1 person did not report her marital status in 1981.
females males
Table 3: Percentage of the elderly living alone: Uruguay 1981
total
females: single females: married
females: divorced females: widow
 
 
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.479 3290 65-69 0.471 1885 65-69 0.490 1405
70-74 0.488 2611 70-74 0.456 1551 70-74 0.534 1060
75-79 0.514 1798 75-79 0.455 1102 75-79 0.607 696
80- 0.418 2107 80- 0.343 1412 80- 0.571 695
Total 0.475 9806 Total 0.434 5950 Total 0.538 3856
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.283 159 65-69 0.580 948
70-74 0.245 143 70-74 0.648 572
75-79 0.405 106 75-79 0.673 285
80- 0.271 147 80- 0.706 170
Total 0.294 555 Total 0.624 1975
age group living alone (%) obs. age group living alone (%) obs.
65-69 0.387 150 65-69 0.374 628
70-74 0.423 97 70-74 0.353 739
75-79 0.405 57 75-79 0.373 654
80- 0.326 46 80- 0.296 1049
Total 0.392 350 Total 0.342 3070
females: divorced females: widow
females: single females: married





  36age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.266 337 65-69 0.043 118 65-69 0.384 219
70-74 0.363 298 70-74 0.137 119 70-74 0.509 179
75-79 0.195 164 75-79 0.102 74 75-79 0.268 90
80- 0.162 198 80- 0.147 93 80- 0.170 105
Total 0.262 997 Total 0.106 404 Total 0.357 593
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.293 175 65-69 0.236 162
70-74 0.363 164 70-74 0.364 134
75-79 0.138 78 75-79 0.261 86
80- 0.123 116 80- 0.218 82
Total 0.253 533 Total 0.273 464
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.020 55 65-69 0.064 63
70-74 0.110 63 70-74 0.168 56
75-79 0.100 31 75-79 0.104 43
80- 0.119 54 80- 0.191 39
Total 0.086 203 Total 0.126 201
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.414 120 65-69 0.346 99
70-74 0.503 101 70-74 0.520 78
75-79 0.161 47 75-79 0.428 43
80- 0.126 62 80- 0.233 43
Total 0.342 330 Total 0.379 263








  37age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.377 926 65-69 0.251 370 65-69 0.460 556
70-74 0.327 673 70-74 0.223 284 70-74 0.398 389
75-79 0.291 500 75-79 0.204 213 75-79 0.346 287
80- 0.258 598 80- 0.108 229 80- 0.342 369
Total 0.321 2697 Total 0.205 1096 Total 0.396 1601
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.373 480 65-69 0.381 446
70-74 0.285 366 70-74 0.385 307
75-79 0.280 254 75-79 0.303 246
80- 0.223 340 80- 0.306 258
Total 0.297 1440 Total 0.352 1257
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.266 175 65-69 0.237 195
70-74 0.232 148 70-74 0.212 136
75-79 0.245 91 75-79 0.175 122
80- 0.091 117 80- 0.129 112
Total 0.213 531 Total 0.197 565
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.438 305 65-69 0.487 251
70-74 0.317 218 70-74 0.525 171
75-79 0.296 163 75-79 0.428 124
80- 0.292 223 80- 0.413 146
Total 0.344 909 Total 0.469 692
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age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.769 1341 65-69 0.762 765 65-69 0.778 576
70-74 0.873 1102 70-74 0.844 630 70-74 0.911 472
75-79 0.917 706 75-79 0.886 419 75-79 0.962 287
80- 0.934 677 80- 0.916 440 80- 0.966 237
Total 0.855 3826 Total 0.838 2254 Total 0.880 1572
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.915 82 65-69 0.584 361
70-74 0.903 62 70-74 0.654 214
75-79 0.884 43 75-79 0.678 93
80- 0.915 59 80- 0.672 55
Total 0.907 246 Total 0.624 723
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.778 36 65-69 0.940 285
70-74 0.893 28 70-74 0.954 326
75-79 0.864 22 75-79 0.962 261
80- 1.000 8 80- 0.956 318
Total 0.851 94 Total 0.953 1190
Note: 1. 1 person did not report her marital status in 1981.
         2. The social security coverage is based on the reported social security income. If they do not report social security income, 
         they are considered as being not covered. Therefore, the coverage for married females may be underestimated.
Table 7: Percentage of the elderly covered by social security: Uruguay 1981
total females males
females: single females: married
females: divorced females: widow
 
  39 
 
 
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.774 3290 65-69 0.785 1885 65-69 0.759 1405
70-74 0.893 2611 70-74 0.892 1551 70-74 0.895 1060
75-79 0.940 1798 75-79 0.931 1102 75-79 0.954 696
80- 0.965 2107 80- 0.959 1412 80- 0.978 695
Total 0.877 9806 Total 0.881 5950 Total 0.871 3856
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.873 159 65-69 0.667 948
70-74 0.924 143 70-74 0.770 572
75-79 0.953 106 75-79 0.799 285
80- 0.959 147 80- 0.846 170
Total 0.924 555 Total 0.731 1975
age group covered by social security (%) obs. age group covered by social security (%) obs.
65-69 0.752 150 65-69 0.949 628
70-74 0.906 97 70-74 0.978 739
75-79 0.929 57 75-79 0.985 654
80- 0.913 46 80- 0.979 1049
Total 0.845 350 Total 0.974 3070
females: divorced females: widow
females: single females: married
Table 8: Percentage of the elderly covered by social security: Uruguay 1995
total females males
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age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs.
65-69 1897.19 1962.68 1031 65-69 1439.91 1396.44 583 65-69 2491.88 2389.29 448
70-74 1807.91 1645.37 962 70-74 1393.79 1116.38 532 70-74 2319.68 2011.17 430
75-79 1712.96 1661.29 647 75-79 1391.16 1150.71 371 75-79 2145.21 2091.22 276
80- 1531.72 1335.98 632 80- 1381.57 1156.29 403 80- 1795.83 1572.27 229
Total 1763.93 1707.30 3272 Total 1404.90 1223.27 1889 Total 2253.93 2106.41 1383
age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs.
65-69 1528.39 1537.64 75 65-69 1230.45 1086.65 211
70-74 1494.88 1181.72 56 70-74 1263.83 881.93 140
75-79 1071.65 593.74 38 75-79 1338.76 1175.66 63
80- 1383.74 698.70 54 80- 1122.32 421.68 37
Total 1407.00 1155.54 223 Total 1247.10 999.38 451
age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs.
65-69 984.05 397.10 28 65-69 1628.99 1598.70 268
70-74 1292.03 622.09 25 70-74 1442.36 1223.11 311
75-79 1223.77 473.53 19 75-79 1465.46 1234.87 251
80- 2417.52 2500.66 8 80- 1385.46 1219.29 304
Total 1280.59 969.08 80 Total 1476.33 1324.29 1134
Note: 1. 1 person did not report her marital status in 1981. Her reported social security income is $1102.48.
Table 9: Average social security income of the elderly: Uruguay 1981
annual income in 1990 US dollars
total females males
females: single females: married
females: divorced females: widow
 
  41age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs.
65-69 1977.10 1819.75 2549 65-69 1654.95 1541.06 1481 65-69 2424.28 2066.57 1068
70-74 2097.57 2090.81 2333 70-74 1727.15 1622.34 1384 70-74 2638.89 2534.74 949
75-79 2044.64 2053.80 1690 75-79 1711.64 1573.32 1026 75-79 2559.98 2546.59 664
80- 1905.65 1941.77 2034 80- 1697.33 1585.87 1354 80- 2321.84 2454.74 680
Total 2006.13 1972.10 8606 Total 1696.04 1580.48 5245 Total 2490.97 2383.35 3361
age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs.
65-69 1795.99 2050.77 139 65-69 1355.94 1150.39 633
70-74 1927.35 1674.73 132 70-74 1234.12 888.29 441
75-79 1698.45 1806.40 101 75-79 1224.96 698.63 228
80- 1684.11 1358.24 141 80- 1386.69 1229.27 144
Total 1779.73 1732.43 513 Total 1301.25 1024.69 1446
age group ave. income std.dev. obs. age group ave. income std.dev. obs.
65-69 1753.94 1723.10 113 65-69 1920.31 1671.63 596
70-74 1628.80 1179.40 88 70-74 2002.55 1910.20 723
75-79 1609.62 2202.50 53 75-79 1893.38 1658.99 644
80- 1735.88 1453.22 42 80- 1741.02 1659.53 1027
Total 1688.38 1639.73 296 Total 1872.82 1727.93 2990
Table 10: Average social security income of the elderly: Uruguay 1995
total females males
females: divorced females: widow
females: single females: married
annual income in 1990 US dollar
 
 






Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) -0.185 0.157 -0.053 0.182
Education(some secondary) -0.545* 0.289 -0.178 0.043
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.370* 0.178 -0.115 0.034
Education (some higher education) -0.442* 0.047 -0.141 0.013
Age (70-74) 0.074 0.092 0.020 0.290
Age (75-79) -0.130 0.319 -0.037 0.164
Age (80+) -0.021 0.431 -0.006 0.234
Covered by social security 0.026 0.122 0.007 0.343
Year dummy:1989 -0.018 0.044 -0.005 0.525
Constant 0.955* 0.039
Note:1. Standard errors are adjusted for correlations within year.
          2 The coefficients of independent variables are significant at the 5 percent level (*).
          3.The social security coverage is based on the reported social security income. If the elderly people do not report social security income,
         they are considered as being not covered. Therefore, the coverage for married females may be underestimated.
Table 11
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled





Urban males N= 955
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) -0.065 0.460 -0.021 0.166
Education(some secondary) -0.536* 0.085 -0.191 0.047
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.224 0.455 -0.075 0.027
Education (some higher education) -0.618 0.486 -0.223 0.049
Age (70-74) -0.046 0.279 -0.015 0.259
Age (75-79) -0.302* 0.011 -0.101 0.148
Age (80+) -0.449* 0.0003 -0.151 0.232
Covered by social security 0.028 0.169 0.009 0.427
Year dummy:1989 0.089* 0.005 0.028 0.531
Constant 0.869* 0.041
Table 12
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled







  43Uruguay: 1981,1995
Urban females N=8,204
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.061* 0.023 0.024 0.322
Education(some secondary) -0.108* 0.053 -0.042 0.088
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.159* 0.069 -0.063 0.017
Education (some higher education) -0.163* 0.075 -0.064 0.050
Age (70-74) 0.038* 0.014 0.015 0.268
Age (75-79) 0.079 0.069 0.030 0.185
Age (80+) 0.393* 0.113 0.147 0.220
Covered by social security 0.130 0.093 0.051 0.863
Year dummy:1995 -0.190* 0.015 -0.073 0.589
Constant 0.132 0.128
Table 13
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled







Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.087* 0.008 0.035 0.286
Education(some secondary) -0.108* 0.0003 -0.043 0.099
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.042 0.032 -0.017 0.025
Education (some higher education) -0.081 0.056 -0.032 0.060
Age (70-74) -0.078* 0.008 -0.031 0.286
Age (75-79) -0.143 0.130 -0.057 0.181
Age (80+) -0.039 0.149 -0.016 0.167
Covered by social security -0.115 0.087 -0.046 0.875
Year dummy:1995 -0.151* 0.001 -0.060 0.570
Constant 0.204 0.122
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled
Table 14










  44Mexico: 1984,1989
Rural females N=734 Rural females N=734
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)
Education(primary completed) -0.341 0.568 -0.107 0.055
Education(some secondary) -2.233* 1.041 -0.718 0.003
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.32 0.314 -0.101 0.005
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) -0.052 0.171 -0.015 0.307 -0.076 0.190 -0.022 0.307
Age (75-79) -0.254 0.213 -0.076 0.150 -0.245 0.245 -0.074 0.150
Age (80+) 0.287 0.389 0.075 0.239 0.291 0.387 0.077 0.239
Covered by social security 0.271* 0.146 0.070 0.154 0.239* 0.076 0.063 0.154
Year dummy:1989 -0.228* 0.006 -0.063 0.533 -0.200* 0.013 -0.056 0.533
Constant 0.930* 0.154 0.895* 0.198
Rural females N= 226
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars) 0.152 0.089 0.056 6.011
Education(primary completed) -0.669 0.772 -0.261 0.049
Education(some secondary)
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.514 1.247 -0.201 0.007
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) 0.149 0.328 0.055 0.344
Age (75-79) -0.806 0.660 -0.312 0.139
Age (80+)
Covered by social security 0.471* 0.244 0.161 0.151
Year dummy:1989 -0.432* 0.112 -0.158 0.530
Constant -0.276 0.681
Table 15 (Rural)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled
0: living alone 1: living with others
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Mexico: 1984, 1989
Rural females N= 226
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars) 0.170 0.121 0.063 6.011
Education(primary completed) -0.654 0.788 -0.255 0.049
Education(some secondary)
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.099 1.345 -0.037 0.007
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) -0.008 0.578 -0.003 0.344
Age (75-79) -0.873 0.890 -0.337 0.139
Age (80+) -0.438 0.419 -0.169 0.175
Covered by social security
Year dummy:1989 -0.450* 0.038 -0.165 0.530
Constant -0.166 1.078
Rural females N= 226
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars) 0.140 0.108 0.052 6.011
Education(primary completed)
Education(some secondary)
Education (secondary or preparatory completed)
Education (some higher education) -0.049 0.535 -0.018 0.344
Age (70-74) -0.900 0.867 -0.347 0.139
Age (75-79) -0.455 0.423 -0.175 0.175
Age (80+)
Covered by social security
Year dummy:1989 -0.399* 0.018 -0.146 0.530
Constant -0.026 1.042
Table 16 (Rural)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled














Variables CoefficientsErrors Variables CoefficientsErrors
Log (Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.021 0.039 Years of schooling -0.005 0.020
Education(primary completed) -0.219 0.222 Mean age of the household 0.020* 0.003
Education(some secondary) Mean labor market status 0.209 0.130
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.315 0.471 of the household
Education (some higher education) Constant -1.654* 0.184
Age (70-74) 0.058 0.084
Age (75-79) -0.134 0.122
Age (80+)
Covered by social security 0.029 0.085
Year dummy:1989 0.407* 0.080
Constant -1.256* 0.247
Table 17 (Rural)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled
0: living alone 1: living with others
 
 
  46Mexico: 1984, 1989
Rural males N=766 Rural males N=766
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars))
Education(primary completed) -0.399* 0.193 -0.138 0.036
Education(some secondary) 0.185 0.167 0.054 0.015
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.270 0.450 -0.092 0.003
Education (some higher education) -1.303 1.239 -0.484 0.005
Age (70-74) -0.205* 0.085 -0.066 0.281 -0.193* 0.064 -0.062 0.281
Age (75-79) -0.284* 0.038 -0.094 0.202 -0.255* 0.059 -0.084 0.202
Age (80+) 0.044 0.054 0.013 0.182 0.081 0.050 0.025 0.182
Covered by social security 0.225 0.478 0.066 0.165 0.240 0.470 0.071 0.165
Year dummy:1989 -0.150* 0.042 -0.047 0.546 -0.154* 0.041 -0.048 0.546
Constant 0.872* 0.071 0.833* 0.060
Rural males N= 590
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.162 0.171 0.057 6.833
Education(primary completed) -0.698 0.477 -0.269 0.037
Education(some secondary) 0.196 0.475 0.066 0.013
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.303 0.526 -0.114 0.004
Education (some higher education) -1.328 0.931 -0.488 0.006
Age (70-74) -0.223* 0.036 -0.080 0.316
Age (75-79) -0.640* 0.204 -0.242 0.165
Age (80+) -0.288* 0.012 -0.106 0.135
Covered by social security 0.189 0.344 0.064 0.168
Year dummy:1989 -0.127* 0.027 -0.045 0.545
Constant -0.323 1.159
Table 18 (Rural)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled







Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.175 0.192 0.062 6.833
Education(primary completed) -0.713 0.484 -0.275 0.037
Education(some secondary) 0.311 0.690 0.100 0.013
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.168 0.277 -0.061 0.004
Education (some higher education) -1.356 0.886 -0.496 0.006
Age (70-74) -0.219* 0.052 -0.079 0.316
Age (75-79) -0.627* 0.174 -0.236 0.165
Age (80+) -0.288* 0.019 -0.106 0.135
Covered by social security
Year dummy:1989 -0.103* 0.015 -0.036 0.545
Constant -0.399 1.282
Rural males N= 590
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.150 0.165 0.053 6.833
Education(primary completed)
Education(some secondary)
Education (secondary or preparatory completed)
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) -0.204* 0.044 -0.073 0.316
Age (75-79) -0.591* 0.180 -0.223 0.165
Age (80+) -0.232* 0.055 -0.085 0.135
Covered by social security
Year dummy:1989 -0.108* 0.013 -0.038 0.545
Constant -0.284 1.115
Table 19 (Rural)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled









Variables CoefficientsErrors Variables CoefficientsErrors
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.060 0.037 Years of schooling 0.049* 0.023
Education(primary completed) 0.002 0.222 Mean age of the household 0.031* 0.003
Education(some secondary) 0.325 0.441 Mean labor market status 0.784* 0.191
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.083 0.667 of the household
Education (some higher education) -0.594 0.727 Constant -1.332* 0.204
Age (70-74) -0.081 0.080
Age (75-79) -0.280* 0.111
Age (80+) -0.229 0.123
Covered by social security 0.094 0.104
Year dummy:1989 0.452 0.074
Constant -0.564 0.262
Table 20 (Rural)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled







Urban females N=1,239 Urban females N=1,239
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars))
Education(primary completed) -0.185 0.157 -0.053 0.182
Education(some secondary) -0.545* 0.289 -0.178 0.043
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.370* 0.178 -0.115 0.034
Education (some higher education) -0.442* 0.047 -0.141 0.013
Age (70-74) 0.074 0.092 0.020 0.290 0.067 0.094 0.018 0.290
Age (75-79) -0.130 0.319 -0.037 0.164 -0.114 0.309 -0.032 0.164
Age (80+) -0.021 0.431 -0.006 0.234 0.005 0.404 0.001 0.234
Covered by social security 0.026 0.122 0.007 0.343 -0.047 0.107 -0.013 0.343
Year dummy:1989 -0.018 0.044 -0.005 0.525 -0.011 0.033 -0.003 0.525
Constant 0.955* 0.039 0.887* 0.006
Urban females N=450
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.184* 0.064 0.061 6.844
Education(primary completed) -0.043 0.216 -0.014 0.233
Education(some secondary) -0.355 0.361 -0.128 0.040
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.362* 0.162 -0.130 0.055
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) 0.178 0.204 0.058 0.299
Age (75-79) -0.014 0.782 -0.005 0.219
Age (80+) -0.388 0.218 -0.138 0.148
Covered by social security 0.279 0.182 0.091 0.409
Year dummy:1989 -0.330* 0.044 -0.110 0.454
Constant -0.569 0.628
Table 21 (Urban)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled




  48Mexico: 1984, 1989
Urban females N=450
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.184* 0.058 0.061 6.844
Education(primary completed) 0.052 0.107 0.017 0.233
Education(some secondary) -0.256 0.320 -0.091 0.040
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.280 0.220 -0.100 0.055
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) 0.180 0.215 0.058 0.299
Age (75-79) -0.075 0.715 -0.025 0.219
Age (80+) -0.445 0.285 -0.160 0.148
Covered by social security




Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.175* 0.058 0.058 6.844
Education(primary completed)
Education(some secondary)
Education (secondary or preparatory completed)
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) 0.176 0.213 0.057 0.299
Age (75-79) -0.057 0.720 -0.019 0.219
Age (80+) -0.439 0.246 -0.158 0.148
Covered by social security
Year dummy:1989 -0.327* 0.055 -0.110 0.454
Constant -0.428 0.545
Table 22 (Urban)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled













Variables Coefficients Errors Variables Coefficients Errors
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) 0.054* 0.024 Years of schooling 0.038* 0.010
Education(primary completed) 0.120 0.087 Mean age of the household 0.021* 0.002
Education(some secondary) 0.172 0.154 Mean labor market status 0.036 0.108
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.126 0.185 of the household
Education (some higher education) Constant -1.571* 0.137
Age (70-74) 0.020 0.072
Age (75-79) 0.087 0.061
Age (80+) -0.003 0.093
Covered by social security 0.066 0.059
Year dummy:1989 0.478* 0.066
Constant -1.451* 0.173
Table 23 (Urban)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled









  49Mexico: 1984, 1989
Urban males N=955 Urban males N=955
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars))
Education(primary completed) -0.065 0.460 -0.021 0.166
Education(some secondary) -0.536* 0.085 -0.191 0.047
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.224 0.455 -0.075 0.027
Education (some higher education) -0.618 0.486 -0.223 0.049
Age (70-74) -0.046 0.279 -0.015 0.259 -0.004 0.298 -0.001 0.259
Age (75-79) -0.302* 0.011 -0.101 0.148 -0.252* 0.011 -0.084 0.148
Age (80+) -0.449* 0.000 -0.151 0.232 -0.404* 0.042 -0.136 0.232
Covered by social security 0.028 0.169 0.009 0.427 -0.059 0.106 -0.019 0.427
Year dummy:1989 0.089* 0.005 0.028 0.531 0.058* 0.008 0.018 0.531
Constant 0.869* 0.041 0.813* 0.105
Urban males N=744
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.119 0.074 -0.042 7.439
Education(primary completed) 0.073 0.339 0.025 0.165
Education(some secondary) -0.336* 0.056 -0.125 0.061
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.055 0.400 0.019 0.035
Education (some higher education) -0.225 0.383 -0.083 0.065
Age (70-74) -0.088 0.343 -0.031 0.275
Age (75-79) -0.528* 0.057 -0.198 0.142
Age (80+) -1.028* 0.116 -0.388 0.166
Covered by social security 0.181 0.226 0.063 0.473
Year dummy:1989 0.052* 0.004 0.018 0.519
Constant 1.571* 0.452
Table 24 (Urban)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled
0: living alone 1: living with others
 
 
Mexico: 1984, 1989 :
Urban males N=744
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.112* 0.055 -0.039 7.439
Education(primary completed) 0.088 0.342 0.031 0.165
Education(some secondary) -0.276* 0.049 -0.102 0.061
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.100 0.444 0.034 0.035
Education (some higher education) -0.175 0.324 -0.064 0.065
Age (70-74) -0.068 0.374 -0.024 0.275
Age (75-79) -0.517* 0.022 -0.194 0.142
Age (80+) -1.029* 0.110 -0.389 0.166
Covered by social security




Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.124 0.088 -0.044 7.439
Education(primary completed)
Education(some secondary)
Education (secondary or preparatory completed)
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) -0.047 0.390 -0.017 0.275
Age (75-79) -0.498* 0.014 -0.187 0.142
Age (80+) -0.998* 0.155 -0.377 0.166
Covered by social security
Year dummy:1989 0.042* 0.015 0.015 0.519
Constant 1.653* 0.575
Table 25 (Urban)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled









Variables Coefficients Errors Variables CoefficientsErrors
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.026 0.029 Years of schooling 0.097* 0.014
Education(primary completed) 0.371* 0.103 Mean age of the household 0.023* 0.002
Education(some secondary) 0.117 0.165 Mean labor market status 0.285* 0.136
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.160 0.260 of the household
Education (some higher education) 0.128 0.188 Constant -0.865* 0.178
Age (70-74) -0.104 0.059
Age (75-79) -0.182* 0.074
Age (80+) -0.419* 0.110
Covered by social security 0.014 0.060
Year dummy:1989 0.457* 0.057
Constant 0.028 0.203
Table 26 (Urban)
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled
0: living alone 1: living with others
 




Mexico: 1984-1989 Rural females
Means Means
Variables Coefficients in 1984 in 1989
Education(primary completed) -0.341 0.069 0.041 Estimated probabilities of living with others The explanatory power
Education(some secondary) -2.233* 0.005 0.002 1984 0.827 of each independent variable
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.32 0.015 0.002 1989 0.835 for the change in the
Education (some higher education) estimated probability
Age (70-74) -0.052 0.31 0.279 Estimated probabilities at the mean values in 1984 except the following:
Age (75-79) -0.254 0.153 0.171 Covered by social security 0.834 87.50%
Age (80+) 0.287 0.266 0.22 Age (75-79) 0.826 -12.50%
Covered by social security 0.271* 0.108 0.218 Education(some secondary) 0.829 25%
Year dummy:1995 -0.228*
Constant 0.930*
Mexico : 1984-1989 Rural males
Means Means
Variables Coefficients in 1984 in 1989
Education(primary completed) -0.399* 0.05 0.32 Estimated probabilities of living with others
Education(some secondary) 0.185 0.01 0.011 1984 0.774
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.270 0 0.005 1989 0.747
Education (some higher education) -1.303 0.005 0.004
Age (70-74) -0.205* 0.279 0.241 Estimated probabilities at the mean values in 1984 except the following:
Age (75-79) -0.284* 0.214 0.216 Covered by social security 0.779 -18.50%
Age (80+) 0.044 0.22 0.194 Age (75-79) 0.774 0%
Covered by social security 0.225 0.134 0.198 Education(primary completed) 0.740 126%
Year dummy:1995 -0.150* Education(some secondary) 0.773 3.70%
Constant 0.872*
Table 27




















  51Uruguay : 1981,1995
all females N= 7134 all females N= 7134
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.073* 0.021 0.028 0.312 0.056 0.038 0.021 0.312
Education(some secondary) -0.031 0.048 -0.012 0.083 -0.060* 0.013 -0.023 0.083
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.028 0.103 -0.011 0.015 -0.011 0.063 -0.004 0.015
Education (some higher education) 0.027 0.066 0.010 0.053 0.091 0.057 0.034 0.053
Age (70-74) 0.070* 0.007 0.027 0.271 -0.015 0.009 -0.006 0.271
Age (75-79) 0.111* 0.062 0.042 0.196 -0.056 0.066 -0.021 0.196
Age (80+) 0.430* 0.110 0.158 0.240 0.180 0.125 0.068 0.240
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.165* 0.005 -0.064 7.126 -0.271* 0.045 -0.104 7.126
Log(Social security income)*single 0.032* 0.003 0.012 0.753
Log(Social security income)*widow 0.038* 0.005 0.015 4.187
Log(Social security income)*married -0.092* 0.005 -0.035 1.822
Year dummy:1995*single 0.030* 0.003 0.012 0.059
Year dummy:1995*widow -0.105* 0.010 -0.040 0.343
Year dummy:1995*married -0.015 0.055 -0.006 0.165
Year dummy:1995 -0.203* 0.010 -0.078 0.601 -0.096* 0.035 -0.037 0.601
constant 1.404* 0.069 2.239* 0.317
**Note: 2. test **Note:3. test
all females N= 7134 all females N= 7134
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.057 0.037 0.022 0.312 0.070* 0.020 0.027 0.312
Education(some secondary) -0.057* 0.014 -0.022 0.083 -0.037 0.045 -0.014 0.083
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.005 0.070 -0.002 0.015 -0.00002 0.087 0.000 0.015
Education (some higher education) 0.090 0.058 0.034 0.053 0.058 0.030 0.022 0.053
Age (70-74) -0.014 0.009 -0.006 0.271 0.024 0.050 0.009 0.271
Age (75-79) -0.055 0.067 -0.021 0.196 0.019 0.149 0.007 0.196
Age (80+) 0.178 0.124 0.067 0.240 0.278 0.240 0.104 0.240
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.359* 0.038 -0.138 7.126 -0.234* 0.066 -0.090 7.126
Log(Social security income)*single 0.126* 0.005 0.049 0.753
Log(Social security income)*widow 0.122* 0.002 0.047 4.187
Log(Social security income)*married 0.092* 0.001 0.035 0.362
Year dummy:1995*single 0.889 0.065 0.279 0.059
Year dummy:1995*widow 0.642 0.028 0.215 0.034
Year dummy:1995*married 0.791 0.082 0.286 0.343
Year dummy:1995 -0.157* 0.015 -0.060 0.601 -0.753 0.030 -0.277 0.601
constant 2.248* 0.306 1.945 0.554
Note:1. When the same regression is analyzed by education groups, the coefficients do not change very much. (by 0.02 at the most for social security income)
Note: 2. test Note: 3. test *These tests reject the similarity of the coefficients of social security income by marital status.
           The statistic is  533.73.            The statistic is  92.35.
         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000          Prob > chi2 =    0.0000
Table 28
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled
0: living alone 1: living with others
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Uruguay: 1981,1995
all females N=7,134 all females N=7,134
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.057 0.034 0.022 0.312
Education(some secondary) -0.059* 0.017 -0.023 0.083
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.016 0.073 -0.006 0.015
Education (some higher education) 0.081 0.056 0.031 0.053
Age (70-74) 0.071* 0.003 0.027 0.271 -0.013* 0.006 -0.005 0.271
Age (75-79) 0.110 0.058 0.042 0.196 -0.054 0.064 -0.021 0.196
Age (80+) 0.429* 0.103 0.158 0.240 0.185 0.123 0.070 0.240
a dummy for married people -0.854* 0.005 -0.330 0.261








Year dummy:1995 -0.203* 0.009 -0.078 0.601 -0.159* 0.014 -0.060 0.601
constant 1.424* 0.161 2.388* 0.299
all females N=7,134
Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed)
Education(some secondary)
Education (secondary or preparatory completed)
Education (some higher education)
Age (70-74) -0.014* 0.004 -0.005 0.271
Age (75-79) -0.056 0.062 -0.022 0.196
Age (80+) 0.185 0.119 0.070 0.240
a dummy for married people -0.853* 0.003 -0.329 0.261








Year dummy:1995 -0.159* 0.014 -0.061 0.601
constant 2.366* 0.377
Table 29
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled







  53Uruguay : 1981,1995
all females N= 7404 all females N= 7404
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.103* 0.008 0.040 0.312
Education(some secondary) 0.012 0.022 0.005 0.088
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.035 0.094 0.014 0.016
Education (some higher education) 0.102 0.057 0.039 0.053
Age (70-74) 0.064* 0.004 0.024 0.269 0.062* 0.001 0.024 0.269
Age (75-79) 0.116 0.071 0.044 0.193 0.111 0.068 0.042 0.193
Age (80+) 0.430* 0.109 0.159 0.235 0.425* 0.103 0.157 0.235
Dummy variable for married people








Year dummy:1995 -0.182* 0.013 -0.070 0.601 -0.180* 0.012 -0.069 0.601
constant 1.795* 0.197 1.743* 0.257
all females N= 7134 all females N= 7134
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.098* 0.023 0.037 0.312
Education(some secondary) 0.028 0.035 0.011 0.083
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.066 0.083 0.025 0.015
Education (some higher education) 0.100* 0.045 0.038 0.053
Age (70-74) 0.064* 0.011 0.025 0.271 0.067* 0.015 0.025 0.271
Age (75-79) 0.095 0.066 0.036 0.196 0.102 0.069 0.039 0.196
Age (80+) 0.421* 0.104 0.155 0.240 0.429* 0.109 0.158 0.240
Dummy variable for married people








Year dummy:1995 -0.182* 0.012 -0.070 0.601 -0.185* 0.013 -0.071 0.601
constant 1.721* 0.249 1.789* 0.189
Table 30
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled










  54Uruguay : 1981,1995
females: single N= 736 females: single N= 736
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) -0.051 0.034 -0.017 0.307
Education(some secondary) -0.222* 0.061 -0.079 0.099
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.094 0.241 -0.033 0.022
Education (some higher education) 0.327 0.300 0.102 0.087
Age (70-74) 0.251* 0.018 0.082 0.254 0.230* 0.005 0.076 0.254
Age (75-79) -0.011 0.195 -0.004 0.185 -0.037 0.180 -0.013 0.185
Age (80+) 0.311 0.177 0.101 0.261 0.299 0.174 0.097 0.261
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.354* 0.046 -0.120 7.115 -0.303* 0.096 -0.103 7.115
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars))
Year dummy:1995 -0.056 0.015 -0.019 0.555 -0.075* 0.032 -0.025 0.555
constant 2.988* 0.409 2.637* 0.752
females: single N= 780 females: single N= 780
Standard Standard
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.025* 0.011 0.008 0.309
Education(some secondary) -0.069 0.120 -0.023 0.105
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.064 0.229 0.021 0.021
Education (some higher education) 0.548* 0.218 0.156 0.086
Age (70-74) 0.296* 0.089 0.095 0.255 0.264* 0.084 0.085 0.255
Age (75-79) -0.069 0.231 -0.023 0.182 -0.114 0.228 -0.039 0.182
Age (80+) 0.313 0.247 0.100 0.255 0.284 0.260 0.092 0.255
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars))
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.462* 0.067 -0.155 7.245 -0.368* 0.085 -0.124 7.245
Year dummy:1995 0.014 0.024 0.005 0.552 -0.002 0.040 -0.001 0.552
constant 3.733* 0.605 3.131* 0.728
Table 31
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled




females: divorced N= 376 females: divorced N= 376
Standard Standard 
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.271* 0.119 0.102 0.292
Education(some secondary) -0.163 0.509 -0.063 0.116
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.027 0.046 -0.011 0.030
Education (some higher education) 0.008 0.017 0.003 0.067
Age (70-74) 0.098* 0.001 0.037 0.303 0.089* 0.016 0.034 0.303
Age (75-79) 0.117 0.085 0.044 0.198 0.121 0.064 0.046 0.198
Age (80+) 0.176 0.271 0.066 0.128 0.202 0.207 0.076 0.128
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.337* 0.128 -0.129 7.113 -0.343* 0.097 -0.132 7.113
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars))
Year dummy:1995 -0.097* 0.011 -0.037 0.668 -0.070* 0.004 -0.027 0.668
constant 2.601* 0.868 2.688* 0.669
females: divorced N= 423 females: divorced N= 423
Standard Standard 
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.342* 0.062 0.128 0.290
Education(some secondary) 0.065 0.481 0.025 0.139
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.217* 0.023 0.081 0.034
Education (some higher education) 0.066 0.059 0.025 0.068
Age (70-74) -0.0004 0.015 -0.0002 0.292 -0.006 0.032 -0.002 0.292
Age (75-79) 0.059 0.158 0.023 0.189 0.076 0.163 0.029 0.189
Age (80+) 0.080 0.167 0.030 0.116 0.083 0.085 0.032 0.116
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars))
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.434* 0.172 -0.167 7.306 -0.423* 0.115 -0.163 7.306
Year dummy:1995 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.678 0.049* 0.022 0.019 0.678
constant 3.300* 1.215 3.301* 0.860
Table 32
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled

















females: widow N= 4124 females: widow N= 4124
Standard Standard 
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.127* 0.017 0.044 0.321
Education(some secondary) 0.080* 0.034 0.028 0.080
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.065 0.195 0.022 0.012
Education (some higher education) 0.032 0.024 0.011 0.045
Age (70-74) 0.040 0.033 0.014 0.255 0.038 0.038 0.013 0.255
Age (75-79) 0.030* 0.014 0.010 0.218 0.024 0.016 0.008 0.218
Age (80+) 0.288* 0.090 0.098 0.312 0.280* 0.083 0.095 0.312
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.276* 0.028 -0.097 7.189 -0.268* 0.032 -0.094 7.189
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars))
Year dummy:1995 -0.210* 0.017 -0.072 0.589 -0.205* 0.015 -0.071 0.589
constant 2.467* 0.210 2.457* 0.239
females: widow N= 4196 females: widow N= 4196
Standard Standard 
Variables Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means Coefficients Errors Derivatives Means
Education(primary completed) 0.194* 0.027 0.066 0.322
Education(some secondary) 0.236* 0.012 0.077 0.081
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.259* 0.131 0.084 0.012
Education (some higher education) 0.218* 0.082 0.072 0.045
Age (70-74) 0.042 0.029 0.015 0.254 0.036 0.037 0.013 0.254
Age (75-79) 0.029 0.037 0.010 0.218 0.016 0.038 0.006 0.218
Age (80+) 0.266 0.093 0.090 0.310 0.249* 0.086 0.084 0.310
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.154 7.329
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.442* 0.098 -0.396* 0.083 -0.138 7.329
Year dummy:1995 -0.159* 0.032 -0.055 0.586 -0.154* 0.029 -0.053 0.586
constant 3.663* 0.721 3.418* 0.624
Table 33
Probit of Probability of Living with Others: pooled















  56Uruguay : 1981-1995 Females: single
Means Means
Variables Coefficients in 1981 in 1995
Education(primary completed) -0.051 0.337 0.292 Estimated probabilities of living with others The explanatory power
Education(some secondary) -0.222* 0.073 0.126 1981 0.736 of each independent variable
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.094 0.004 0.036 1995 0.716 for the change in the
Education (some higher education) 0.327 0.081 0.086 estimated probability
Age (70-74) 0.251* 0.252 0.258 Estimated probabilities at the mean values in 1984 except the following:
Age (75-79) -0.011 0.175 0.191 Social security income (in 1990 US dollars) 0.716 100%
Age (80+) 0.311 0.240 0.265 Age (75-79) 0.736 0%
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.354* 7.022 7.188 Education(some secondary) 0.732 20%
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.735 5%
Year dummy:1995 -0.056 Doubled social security income 0.633
constant 2.988* $1000 more social security income 0.648
$500 more social security income 0.680
Uruguay : 1981-1995 Females: divorced
Means Means
Variables Coefficients in 1981 in 1995
Education(primary completed) 0.271* 0.245 0.326 Estimated probabilities of living with others
Education(some secondary) -0.163 0.085 0.169 1981 0.641
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) -0.027 0.021 0.040 1995 0.625
Education (some higher education) 0.008 0.041 0.050
Age (70-74) 0.098* 0.300 0.280 Estimated probabilities at the mean values in 1984 except the following:
Age (75-79) 0.117 0.234 0.163 Social security income (in 1990 US dollars) 0.622 119%
Age (80+) 0.176 0.085 0.131 Age (75-79) 0.638 19%
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.337* 7.012 7.161 Education(some secondary) 0.636 31%
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.641 0%
Year dummy:1995 -0.097* Doubled social security income 0.553
constant 2.601* $1000 more social security income 0.559
$500 more social security income 0.595
Uruguay : 1981-1995 Females: widow
Means Means
Variables Coefficients in 1981 in 1995 Estimated probabilities of living with others
Education(primary completed) 0.127* 0.318 0.329 1981 0.746
Education(some secondary) 0.080* 0.066 0.09 1995 0.733
Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.065 0.007 0.016 0.013
Education (some higher education) 0.032 0.032 0.083 Estimated probabilities at the mean values in 1984 except the following:
Age (70-74) 0.040 0.274 0.241 Social security income (in 1990 US dollars) 0.725 162%
Age (75-79) 0.030* 0.219 0.213 Age (75-79) 0.746 0%
Age (80+) 0.288* 0.267 0.342 Education(some secondary) 0.747 -0.08%
Log(Social security income (in 1990 US dollars)) -0.276* 7.050 7.285 Education (secondary or preparatory completed) 0.746 0%
Log(Total individual income (in 1990 US dollars)) Doubled social security income 0.661
Year dummy:1995 -0.210* $1000 more social security income 0.677
constant 2.467* $500 more social security income 0.700
Table 34
The projection of living arrangements
  57age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs.
65-69 0.92 0.21 1031 65-69 0.95 0.17 583 65-69 0.88 0.25 448
70-74 0.93 0.19 962 70-74 0.95 0.17 532 70-74 0.91 0.21 430
75-79 0.95 0.17 647 75-79 0.96 0.15 371 75-79 0.93 0.19 276
80- 0.96 0.15 632 80- 0.97 0.13 403 80- 0.94 0.18 229
Total 0.94 0.19 3272 Total 0.95 0.16 1889 Total 0.91 0.22 1383
age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs.
65-69 0.91 0.22 75 65-69 0.98 0.09 211
70-74 0.94 0.18 56 70-74 1.00 0.03 140
75-79 0.95 0.18 38 75-79 0.99 0.04 63
80- 0.98 0.11 54 80- 1.00 0.00 37
Total 0.94 0.18 223 Total 0.99 0.07 451
age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs.
65-69 0.98 0.08 28 65-69 0.93 0.20 268
70-74 0.98 0.08 25 70-74 0.93 0.21 311
75-79 0.96 0.13 19 75-79 0.95 0.16 251
80- 1.00 0.00 8 80- 0.96 0.15 304
Total 0.98 0.09 80 Total 0.94 0.18 1134
Note: 1. 1 person did not report her marital status in 1981. Her reported social security income is $1102.48.
Table A.1: The ratio of social security income to total income: Uruguay 1981
total females males
females: single females: married




age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs.
65-69 0.88 0.23 2549 65-69 0.90 0.22 1481 65-69 0.85 0.23 1068
70-74 0.91 0.20 2333 70-74 0.92 0.19 1384 70-74 0.89 0.21 949
75-79 0.93 0.17 1690 75-79 0.94 0.16 1026 75-79 0.92 0.17 664
80- 0.92 0.19 2034 80- 0.92 0.19 1354 80- 0.92 0.19 680
Total 0.91 0.20 8606 Total 0.92 0.19 5245 Total 0.89 0.21 3361
age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs.
65-69 0.89 0.23 139 65-69 0.96 0.15 633
70-74 0.92 0.19 132 70-74 0.98 0.09 441
75-79 0.94 0.18 101 75-79 0.99 0.05 228
80- 0.96 0.13 141 80- 0.99 0.04 144
Total 0.93 0.19 513 Total 0.97 0.12 1446
age group Ratio std.dev. obs. age group Ratio std.dev. obs.
65-69 0.80 0.27 113 65-69 0.86 0.25 596
70-74 0.85 0.27 88 70-74 0.90 0.21 723
75-79 0.90 0.23 53 75-79 0.92 0.17 644
80- 0.93 0.13 42 80- 0.91 0.21 1027
Total 0.85 0.25 296 Total 0.90 0.21 2990
Table A.2: The ratio of social security income to total income: Uruguay 1995
females: divorced females: widow
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country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Paraguay
year 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1996 1998 1999 1996 1998
total 0.51 0.41 0.33 0.30 0.19 0.32 0.24 0.21 0.15 0.26 0.12 0.27 0.24 0.18
females 0.48 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.17 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.24 0.10 0.22 0.23 0.17
males 0.54 0.42 0.36 0.33 0.22 0.35 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.28 0.14 0.33 0.26 0.19
rural 0.51 0.33 0.27 0.25 0.31 0.25 0.19 0.15 0.27 0.12 0.32 0.33 0.18
urban 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.15 0.32 0.23 0.22 0.14 0.25 0.12 0.25 0.19 0.19
country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Peru Paraguay
year 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1996 1998 1999 1996 1998
missing income (%) 19.62 42.33 11.48 12.91 44.58 28.38 44.25 25.53 41.73 42.31 73.9 27.49 28.05 37.39
coefficients -0.086* 0.010 -0.063* -0.121* 0.058* -0.061 0.058 0.046 0.006 0.056* 0.013 0.026 0.005 -0.016
of total individual income
standard errors 0.024 0.036 0.014 0.014 0.022 0.038 0.032 0.034 0.039 0.028 0.103 0.032 0.025 0.058
Obs. in probit 6889 1200 17161 13159 4105 1833 799 1470 824 1723 251 2024 2751 704
Note: 1.  Persons above 65 with non-missing income are considered for the probit analysis. 
Note: 2. Gender, region, education dummies (primary completed, some secondary, secondary completed, and some higher education), 
               age group dummies (70-74, 75-79, 80+), and log (total individual income) are included as explanatory variables.
Note: 3.  In the Venezuelan survey, urban areas are not distinguishable from rural areas. Argentina and Uruguay are urban only.
Note: 4. In the survey of Nicaragua, income from all jobs is utilized instead of income from all sources.
Table A.3: Percentage of elderly living alone: Latin America
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Graph 1
































alone-based on total household income (997 obs.)
alone-based on individual income (553 obs.)
Graph 2































alone-based on total household income (2697 obs.)
alone-based on individual income (1462 obs.)
Graph 3































alone: total  alone: urban
alone: rural 
Graph 4































alone: total alone: urban
alone: rural
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Graph 5 




























alone-based on total household income (3826 obs.)
alone-based on individual income (3509 obs.)
Graph 6





























alone-based on total household income (9806 obs.)
alone-based on individual income (9245 obs.)
Graph 7





























































alone: total alone: male-total
alone: female-total
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